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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-2759 
_____________ 
  
BRANDI BOOKER, Administrator, Estate of Elaine Booker, 
Appellant 
     
v. 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-15-cv-05070) 
Chief District Judge:  Hon. Juan R. Sanchez 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a): 
June 20, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before:  AMBRO, RESTREPO, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  October 24, 2019) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
                                               
 *  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
The estate of Elaine Booker appeals the District Court’s entry of judgment in favor 
of the Government, against which Booker’s estate brought suit under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346.  Following a bench trial on the merits of Booker’s claims, 
the District Court found that Greater Philadelphia Health Action (“GPHA”) and its agents, 
Dr. Heather Ruddock and Dr. Monica Mallory-Whitmore, could not be held liable for 
negligence with respect to the circumstances surrounding Booker’s unfortunate death. 
Similar to the District Court’s findings, we hold that GPHA and its physicians did 
not breach their duty of care in treating Booker. We therefore will affirm. 
I. 
In 2008, Booker, an employee of GPHA, underwent a routine screening for 
tuberculosis as part of GPHA’s employee health program (the “Health Program”).  The 
results of Booker’s screening indicated that she had been exposed to the bacteria that causes 
tuberculosis.  Dr. Ruddock, GPHA’s Health Program physician, ordered a chest X-ray for 
Booker, which did not indicate that she had active tuberculosis.  As a result, Dr. Ruddock 
diagnosed her with latent tuberculosis.  
Dr. Ruddock wrote Booker a nine-month prescription for Isoniazid (“INH”).  Dr. 
Mallory-Whitmore, a GPHA physician who saw Booker in some capacity unrelated to the 
tuberculosis screening, was the prescribing physician named on the medicine bottle.  
Booker took the INH medication as prescribed for four months.  
In late February 2009, Booker began to experience flu-like symptoms, and two 
months later she began to experience a series of other physical issues, including vomiting 
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and loss of appetite.  Booker was diagnosed with INH-induced liver toxicity on April 16, 
2009, and, nine days later, she tragically died as a result of acute liver failure due to INH 
toxicity.  She was sixty-one years old. 
Booker’s estate then brought a wrongful death suit against the Government under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that (a) Dr. Whitmore negligently treated Booker as 
her prescribing physician, (b) Dr. Ruddock negligently treated Booker by prescribing INH 
without subsequently monitoring her treatment, and (c) GPHA negligently supervised its 
healthcare providers and negligently designed its Health Program.  The District Court held 
a three-day bench trial in May 2015.  On July 19, 2018, after a procedural error was 
resolved, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the Government on all three 
claims, concluding that Booker’s estate failed to show by a preponderance of evidence that 
GPHA or its agents breached their duty of care. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  After a bench trial, we “review a district court’s 
findings of fact . . . under the clearly erroneous standard.” Am. Soc’y for Testing & 
Materials v. Corrpro Cos., 478 F.3d 557, 566 (3d Cir. 2007).  We consider the Court’s 
legal determinations de novo but must give “due regard . . . to the trial court’s judgments 
as to the credibility of the witnesses.” DeJesus v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 479 F.3d 
271, 279 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Colliers Lanard & Axilbund v. Lloyds of London, 458 
F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
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III. 
In Pennsylvania, it is settled law that a plaintiff must establish the four elements of 
duty, breach, causation, and actual harm to succeed on a medical malpractice claim. 
Hightower-Warren v. Silk, 698 A.2d 52, 54 (Pa. 1997).  The plaintiff must present expert 
testimony to establish these elements because the medical field is generally beyond the 
scope of a layperson’s ordinary knowledge.  Toogood v. Owen J. Rogal, D.D.S., P.C., 824 
A.2d 1140, 1145 (Pa. 2003) (“[A] plaintiff must present medical expert testimony to 
establish that the care and treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant fell short of the 
required standard of care and that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.”). 
The applicable duty of care in this case is the standard articulated by a credible 
expert witness, as established through expert testimony.1  To establish the applicable duty 
of care, the District Court found credible and relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Jennifer 
Patterson, who testified on Plaintiff’s behalf, and Dr. James Hamilton, who testified on the 
Government’s behalf.  We see no reason to disturb these credibility findings. See DeJesus, 
479 F.3d at 279. 
                                               
1 See, e.g., Rittenhouse v. Hanks, 777 A.2d 1113, 1116–17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) 
(determining the community standard of care by relying on expert testimony in a medical 
malpractice case following a patient’s death from liver failure allegedly caused by a cancer 
medication); Gunn v. Grossman, 748 A.2d 1235, 1239–40 (Pa. Super Ct. 2000) 
(determining the applicable duty of care by relying on expert testimony in a medical 
malpractice case involving a negligently prescribed drug).  This case is a wrongful death 
action, based on an allegedly negligent prescription of medication. Because the facts of this 
case align more closely with that of medical malpractice or ordinary negligence, we decline 
to impose the duty applicable to a prescribing physician as set forth in White v. Weiner, 
562 A.2d 378, 386 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
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IV. 
A. Claim Involving Dr. Whitmore 
Plaintiff’s claim involving Dr. Whitmore fails under the “duty” element of 
negligence because Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Dr. Whitmore owed Booker a duty 
of care.  Plaintiff presented no evidence that Dr. Whitmore was involved in Booker’s 
tuberculosis screening or treatment.  Thus, Dr. Whitmore did not owe Booker a duty of 
care with respect to the INH prescription and has no liability for Booker’s death.  See 
Thierfelder v. Wolfert, 52 A.3d 1251, 1265–66 (Pa. 2012) (“The well-settled standard of 
care for a general medical practitioner is to ‘possess and employ in the treatment of a 
patient the skill and knowledge usually possessed by physicians in the same or a similar 
locality . . . .’” (emphasis added) (quoting Donaldson v. Maffucci, 156 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa. 
1959))). 
B. Claim Involving Dr. Ruddock 
Although Dr. Ruddock owed Booker a duty of care as the Health Program physician 
who interpreted Booker’s screening and prescribed INH as treatment for Booker’s latent 
tuberculosis diagnosis, see id., we agree with the District Court that Dr. Ruddock adhered 
to her duty of care.  As a preliminary matter, both experts agreed that Dr. Ruddock’s 
treatment of Booker’s latent tuberculosis—the nine-month prescription of INH in the 
absence of contraindications and subsequent monitoring by a primary-care physician—was 
appropriate.  See Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1145.  
Further, both experts testified that it was “equally appropriate” for Dr. Ruddock to 
prescribe INH and monitor Booker’s liver function herself as it was for Dr. Ruddock to 
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refer Booker to her primary-care physician.  Therefore, Dr. Ruddock cannot be faulted for 
choosing one of two proper treatment options.  See Donaldson, 156 A.2d at 838 (“[W]here 
among physicians or surgeons of ordinary skill and learning more than one method of 
treatment is recognized as proper, it is not negligence for the physician or the surgeon to 
adopt either of such methods . . . .”). 
C. Claim Involving GPHA 
GPHA cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its agents, Dr. 
Mallory-Whitmore and Dr. Ruddock, because, as outlined above, its agents did not act 
negligently.  Thus, no negligence can be imputed to GPHA.  See Scampone v. Highland 
Park Care Ctr., LLC, 57 A.3d 582, 597 (Pa. 2012).  Additionally, GPHA did not breach its 
duty of care in designing the Health Program.  The District Court credited the testimony of 
the GPHA’s Director, Dr. Janet Young, that the Health Program requires tuberculosis 
screening for the safety of GPHA’s patients and reasonably provides medical professionals 
discretion to use their professional judgment in prescribing a specific treatment for latent 
tuberculosis.  The Health Program’s required screening and deference to the professional 
judgment of medical professionals regarding appropriate treatment was well within the 
standard of care.  See Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1145; Donaldson, 156 A.2d at 838. 
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
